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Introduction 
The recent explosive growth of nonbank specialty 
servicers has prompted calls for regulatory 
intervention. A July 2014 report from the Inspector 
General of the Federal Housing Finance Agency 
(FHFA), on the risks these servicers posed to 
government-sponsored entities (GSEs) in 
particular, fueled the issue, which has been debated 
since the end of the crisis. Earlier this year, 
Benjamin Lawsky, the superintendent of the New 
York State Department of Financial Services, halted 
the bulk sale of mortgage servicing rights (MSRs) 
from Bank of America to Ocwen, the nation’s largest 
and fastest-growing nonbank specialty servicer.  
Nonbank specialty servicers are non-deposit-taking 
companies with a specific focus on servicing 
troubled loans (i.e., those that are delinquent or in 
default). Such companies now hold about 
$1.4 trillion in servicing rights out of a nearly 
$10 trillion market (FHFA OIG 2014). Although 
banks still hold the vast majority of mortgage 
servicing, nonbank servicers have quickly expanded 
their market share. In 2011, the 10 largest mortgage 
servicers were all banks; since 2013, 5 of the top 
servicers have been nonbanks. Concern at the state 
level has scaled up to the national scene, with 
Representative Maxine Waters (D-CA) and FHFA 
officials including the Inspector General, the 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), and 
the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) all 
arguing that the growing volume of mortgage 
servicing performed by nonbank specialty servicers 
warrants additional attention and, potentially, 
policy action (CFPB 2013; FHFA 2014; FHFA OIG 
2014; FSOC 2014; Waters 2014).  
This commentary discusses some of the major 
concerns that have been raised about the largest 
nonbank servicers, focusing on the three fastest-
growing large nonbank servicers: 
• Ocwen Financial Corporation;
• Nationstar Mortgage; and
• Walter Investment Company.
In the past year, their astonishing growth alone has 
served as a catalyst for increased regulatory scrutiny 
(see table 1). We begin by exploring the regulatory 
Table 1: Top 10 Mortgage Servicers, 2011–Q1 2014 
Overall 
Market Rank 
Top 10 Servicers by 





Q1 2014 Market 
Share 
Change in Market Share 
2011–Q1 2014 
#1 Wells Fargo NA 18% 18% 4% 
#2 Chase NA 11% 10% -11% 
#3 Bank of America NA 17% 8% -54% 
#4 Ocwen #1 1% 4.5% 350% 
#5 Nationstar #2 1% 3.9% 290% 
#6 Citi NA 5% 3.9% -25% 
#7 US Bank NA 2% 2.9% 27% 
#8 Walter #3 0% 2.4% NA 
#9 PHH Mortgage #4 2% 2.3% 30% 
#10 Quicken Loans #5 NA 1.5% NA 
Source: Inside Mortgage Finance. 
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and market framework driving the striking growth 
of nonbank specialty servicers, and then address the 
major charges against them, in an effort to elevate 
the debate and inform sound policy.  
The Growth of Specialty Servicers 
Commercial banks remain the dominant owners of 
MSRs, but nonbank servicers are growing quickly. 
According to data from Inside Mortgage Finance 
(IMF), of the 30 largest mortgage servicers, nonbank 
firms held a 17 percent share of the mortgage 
servicing market at the beginning of 2014, up from 
9 percent at the end of 2012, and 6 percent at the 
end of 2011. In the past two years, commercial banks 
have begun reducing their balance of MSRs. Between 
2012 and first quarter (Q1) 2014, Bank of America 
reduced its MSR footprint by 40 percent, and more 
than halved its overall share between 2011 and Q1 
2014. In contrast, the country’s largest nonbank 
servicers (in descending order, Ocwen, Nationstar, 
Walter, PHH, and Quicken) saw their market share 
grow by between 30 percent and 350 percent 
between 2011 and Q1 2014. 
For performing loans, mortgage servicing is a 
relatively straightforward process: servicers oversee 
the collection of payments, respond to borrower 
inquiries, track principal and interest paid, and, if 
necessary, initiate foreclosure proceedings. 
Traditionally, servicing has been handled by the 
originating bank (or one of its affiliates), and the 
banks that are responsible for originating most US 
residential loans tend to dominate the servicing 
space (e.g., Bank of America, JP Morgan Chase, and 
Wells Fargo, among others). The servicing platform 
used by such banks is equipped to handle large 
volumes of performing loans and, prior to the 
financial crisis, this was a generally successful and 
efficient model.  
Beginning in 2007, however, when growing 
numbers of delinquent borrowers needed a higher 
level of interaction with their loan servicers, it 
became clear that the big banks’ servicing platforms 
were ill equipped to adapt to the shifting demand. 
Traditional banks lacked the technical capacity to 
handle the growing volume of distressed loans, 
leading to foreclosure logjams and poor 
modification systems. The introduction of the 
Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) 
created guidelines for streamlined loan 
modifications and oversight of the modification 
industry, but its benefits were slow to accrue to 
needy borrowers (GAO 2014).  
Recognizing that ineffective servicing was 
exacerbating the unfolding crisis, regulators urged 
banks to sell their mortgage servicing rights to 
nonbank servicer firms that specialized in servicing 
loans requiring a higher level of interaction between 
servicer and borrower (FHFA OIG 2014). The 
activities of the three largest nonbank specialty 
servicers by market share—Ocwen, Nationstar, and 
Walter—are the focus of the remainder of this 
commentary. These three entities have been targeted 
by regulators and have been subject to intense media 
attention, are the fastest-growing nonbank specialty 
servicers, and have evolved in ways that have 
contributed to growing regulatory interest.  
We do not focus on PHH and Quicken, nonbanks 
with growing servicing arms whose primary 
business nevertheless is mortgage origination.  
Similarly, we do not focus on small nonbank 
servicers, because so much of the servicing market 
is dominated by large servicers: as of Q1 2014, 
58 percent of the mortgage servicing market was 
being handled by the top 10 largest servicers (data 
from IMF). Ocwen has expanded by acquiring 
smaller competitors, which have struggled with 
increasing compliance costs and declining 
inventory. “[T]he sheer volume of new regulations 
… and the expense of that” was cited by the CEO of
Mortgage Contracting Services—a national 
mortgage field servicing firm based in Tampa, Fla.—
as a reason for its merger with two smaller 
companies in August 2013 (Bay 2014). And as we 
move farther from the crisis, the “decline in 
inventory of [distressed residential mortgages also] 
is spurring consolidation among special servicers” 
(Kilgore 2014).  
The growth of specialty servicers has been 
facilitated by regulatory efforts to reduce credit 
losses by transferring servicing rights on 
government-owned or -guaranteed loans to 
specialty servicers. In 2008, Fannie Mae introduced 
its High Touch Servicing Program, and in 2011, 
purchased servicing rights to 384,000 loans from 
Bank of America with the intent of redistributing 
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them to specialty servicers (FHFA OIG 2012). 
Consequently, specialty servicers began scaling up 
their operations to handle higher amounts of 
delinquent loans. As these servicers became more 
adept at handling high volumes of distressed loans, 
banks gradually became more comfortable 
unloading their servicing rights to them, scaling up 
the volume of MSR transfers and contributing to 
the growth of nonbank specialty servicers. Later, as 
banks emerged from the crisis, the volume of 
distressed loan transfers to specialty servicers 
continued apace, because banks were eager to 
distance themselves from the reputational damage 
incurred during the crisis.  
The growth of nonbank specialty servicers has also 
been influenced by regulatory reforms—in 
particular, Basel III, the postcrisis update to the 
international Basel banking supervisory standards 
designed to strengthen the safety and soundness of 
financial institutions and markets. Adopted by the 
United States in 2013, Basel III made the cost of 
holding on to servicing rights significantly more 
capital intensive for banks. Because specialty 
servicers aren’t obliged to follow the same capital 
requirements as banks, their desire to acquire loan 
portfolios at a time when banks are eager to offload 
their distressed loan portfolios has been something 
of a natural response to different regulatory regimes 
(for more, see Goodman and Lee 2014).  
To recap, key factors contributing to the en-masse shift 
of mortgage servicing from banks to specialty servicers 
have included the difficulty big banks have had in 
managing large volumes of distressed loans,1 
regulatory encouragement for banks and GSEs to 
transfer distressed loan servicing to specialty servicers, 
and regulatory reforms leading to the differential 
treatment of MSR assets for banks and nonbanks.  
1 Said then-Secretary of the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development (HUD) Shaun Donovan on the 
announcement of the $25 billion attorneys general 
settlement in 2012, “One of the most important ways this 
settlement helps homeowners is that it forces the banks to 
clean up their acts and fix the problems uncovered during 
our investigations. And it does that by committing them 
to major reforms in how they service mortgage loans” 
(http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/February/12-ag-
186.html). 
While the top three servicers experienced stagnant 
or declining market shares between 2011 and 2014,2 
Ocwen’s market share increased by 350 percent and 
Nationstar’s increased by 290 percent (see table 1). 
Thus, in 2013, two specialty servicers, Ocwen and 
Nationstar, finally broke into the ranks of the top 
five mortgage servicers. As the volume of servicing 
has shifted from banks to specialty servicers, 
regulators have become nervous that these nonbank 
servicers are not regulated or supervised in the 
same way as banks.  
Traditionally, nonbank institutions have been left to 
the states, but the extent of oversight and consumer 
protections varies and, with severe resource 
constraints at the state level, many state regulators 
have lacked the capacity to enforce state laws and 
protections. Moreover, the concern is not simply that 
banks are subject to more regulations than nonbanks, 
but also that banks are subject to continuous, often 
on-site regulatory oversight. Although one might 
question how much good this did in the past, Dodd-
Frank reforms have resulted in more rigorous 
supervision, by both bank regulators and the CFPB. 
And while nonbanks are now subject to CFPB 
supervision, and the CFPB’s complaint database 
provides the agency with important information that 
regulators have traditionally lacked, the CFPB is a 
relatively new agency, and cannot provide quite the 
degree of coverage or continuous supervision of 
traditional bank regulation.  
FHFA and DFS Raise Concerns 
about Specialty Servicers 
The FHFA Office of the Inspector General (OIG) 
released a report on July 1, 2014, that raised concerns 
about the risks nonbank specialty servicers pose to 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. While this report 
comes at a time of growing regulatory scrutiny, it was 
not the first time that the FHFA OIG has raised 
concerns about nonbank specialty servicers. In 2012, 
OIG reviewed Fannie’s High Touch Servicing 
Program as part of two evaluations: a general 
assessment of the FHFA’s process for reviewing 
2 Between 2011 and 2013, the largest servicer, Wells 
Fargo, experienced a 4 percent growth in its share of the 
servicing market, Chase experienced a 9 percent decline, 
and Bank of America had a 52 percent decline.  
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business decisions made by the GSEs, and a separate 
assessment of the 2011 transfer of MSRs on 
384,000 loans from Bank of America to Fannie Mae. 
In these reviews, the OIG raised concerns about the 
complexity of and risk associated with large MSR 
transfers to specialty servicers, including potential 
disruptions with loss mitigation efforts under way 
under the prior servicer. In 2012, the OIG 
recommended that the FHFA consider developing 
procedures for reviewing significant MSR 
transactions, which has led the FHFA to require the 
GSEs to secure FHFA approval for any MSR transfers 
of portfolios exceeding 25,000 loans. As part of its 
July 2014 report, the OIG recommended that the 
FHFA develop a more comprehensive, formal 
oversight framework for examining and mitigating 
risks posed by nonbank specialty servicers.  
At the same time that the FHFA was raising 
concerns, New York’s newly formed Department of 
Financial Services (DFS) also entered the debate. 
Headed by Superintendent Benjamin Lawsky, the 
DFS has jurisdiction over licensed mortgage bankers 
in New York state. In 2012, the DFS reviewed and 
approved Ocwen’s purchase of another loan 
servicing firm, Litton, on the condition that Ocwen 
remedy Litton’s mishandling of foreclosures. During 
and after the DFS’s follow-up, Lawsky grew 
concerned about Ocwen’s servicing standards and 
handling of loan modifications. In early 2014, 
Lawsky halted Ocwen’s purchase of $39 billion in 
MSRs from Wells Fargo, citing concerns about 
Ocwen’s capacity to handle the added servicing load 
(184,000 loans). As of June 2014, the transaction is 
still on hold. Later, Lawsky raised additional 
concerns about the nature of Ocwen’s business 
partnerships and apprehension that Nationstar’s 
rapid growth might create capacity issues that put 
homeowners at risk.  
The Concerns 
Diverse regulatory concerns about the growth of 
specialty servicers have coalesced around four 
major themes:  
1. Capacity: Has the industry developed an
adequate support infrastructure to keep up with
rapidly expanding portfolios?
2. Servicing Transfers: Can servicers transfer
thousands of high-touch distressed loans in a
way that does not interrupt service to distressed 
borrowers? 
3. Financial Risks and Regulations: Given
their unique volatility and liquidity issues,
should these nonbanks be subject to the same
or a different regulatory standard than banks?
4. Business Affiliations: Does the significant
vertical integration common among the big
nonbanks lead to self-dealing that justifies
regulatory oversight?
1. Capacity
Capacity is a legitimate concern given the fast 
growth of this consumer-focused industry as well as 
its genesis in the housing crisis. To get a sense of the 
industry’s infrastructure capacity, it’s useful to look 
at staffing levels. In 2013, Fitch Ratings, one of the 
credit rating agencies that rates large bank and 
nonbank servicers, looked at how staffing levels 
differed between bank and nonbank servicers. It 
found that following an increase in late 2010, bank 
staffing levels declined as defaulted loans were 
resolved or transferred, while staffing levels at 
nonbanks rose as their portfolios expanded. By 2012, 
the number of loans per employee for banks had 
decreased significantly, from 800 to 500, while the 
average number of loans per employee at nonbanks 
remained steady, at 275, between 2010 and 2012. 
This suggests that the nonbanks were increasing 
their staffing as they were acquiring bulk servicing 
rights, keeping their loan-per-employee ratio steady. 
However, the number of loans per employee at 
nonbanks grew from 300 in Q2 2012 to 400 in Q4 
2013. The recent growth in the number of loans per 
employee could result in poorer service or a similar 
level of service provided with greater efficiency. The 
numbers alone don’t tell the complete story. 
Ocwen, the nation’s largest and fastest-growing 
specialty servicer, has expanded its staffing significantly 
as it has acquired servicing rights to more loans, even 
during the period after 2012. According to 
Morningstar’s Operational Risk Assessments (ORAs), 
in one year, Ocwen increased its overall staffing by 
104 percent, growing from 5,000 employees in June 30, 
2012, to 10,190 employees a year later. This staffing 
growth outpaced Ocwen’s servicing portfolio growth of 
77 percent during the same period (from 586,563 loans 
with an unpaid principal balance [UPB] of $94.3 billion 
to 1,093,557 loans with a UPB of $173 billion). 
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Morningstar’s 2012 ORA noted that Ocwen’s 
“proprietary RealServicing enterprise wide loan 
servicing system … is fully scalable and can support 
more than twice the current servicing portfolio,” 
indicating that at least in 2012, the company was able to 
support a much larger servicing load.  
Offshore Employees 
Ocwen has been criticized for its heavy reliance on 
offshore employees. In 2012, according to the Wall 
Street Journal, Fannie Mae expressed concerns 
about “whether proper controls [could] be enforced 
with call centers in foreign jurisdictions,” which 
could complicate the safeguarding of private 
financial information (Berthelsen and Johnson 
2012). At that time, 82 percent of Ocwen’s 
5,000 employees were located in India. But by mid-
2013, Ocwen had increased its domestic staff by 
455 percent, from 843 to 4,680 US-based 
employees. In that same period, offshore staff also 
grew, but at a much slower pace (32 percent, from 
4,141 to 5,450 employees based in India). Looking 
at raw human capital, it appears that, at the very 
least, Ocwen has been increasing its staffing 
capacity apace with its increased servicing portfolio. 
It’s worth noting that Ocwen has the most offshore 
employees of the three largest specialty servicers, 
and while Nationstar also has offshore employees, 
Walter does not. A 2014 evaluation by S&P noted, 
“Ocwen manages a majority of customer 
interactions including late-stage collection and loss 
mitigation with counselors offshore in India,” and 
found that while other servicers may “handle 
customer service and early-stage delinquency 
interactions offshore, no other residential servicer 
[ranked by S&P] currently provides a significant 
portion of late-stage collection and loss mitigation 
operations offshore” (S&P 2014). S&P also reports 
that many of the other servicers it ranks previously 
offshored collection call center staff to India, but 
have returned those roles to onshore sites in 
response to customer feedback.  
Consumer Complaints 
Some advocates and policymakers view the 
increased volume of consumer complaints against 
nonbank servicers as evidence that they are unable 
to meet the needs of their growing consumer base. 
The evidence, however, is mixed and, depending on 
the source, indicates that nonbank servicers receive 
either more, less, or equivalent complaints as bank 
servicers. For example, in its 10th annual survey of 
housing counselors and attorneys, the California 
Reinvestment Coalition found that while complaints 
against the largest banks continue unabated, 
Nationstar and Ocwen are increasingly listed among 
the worst offenders (CRC 2014). This finding, 
however, may reflect that these two servicers now 
serve a larger consumer base in California (and 
elsewhere) than they have in the past.  
According to a Compass Point analysis of the 
CFPB’s complaint database, while Ocwen, 
Nationstar, and Walter all rank high in terms of 
total number of complaints reported to the CFPB, 
they also service a disproportionate amount of 
distressed loans compared with their bank peers, 
and according to the CFPB’s data, over half of 
mortgage-related complaints have been related to 
loan modifications, collection, or foreclosure—that 
is, borrowers in distress (Barker, Boltansky, and 
Seperson 2014). Looking only at complaints on 
delinquent loans serviced (see table 2), Compass 
Point found that Ocwen, Nationstar, Walter, and 
other nonbank servicers “hav(e) the lowest amount 
of modification/foreclosure complaints per 
delinquent loan out of the largest mortgage 
servicers in the US” (Barker et al. 2014).  
Going forward, policymakers must gauge whether 
complaints against the largest specialty servicers 
reflect true deficits in infrastructure and an inability 
to service a growing customer base, or reflect the 
growing customer base and the nature of that 
base—that is, exclusively nonperforming borrowers. 
Moreover, it is important to take into account the 
possibility that consumer outcomes vary because of 
differing resolutions offered by the different firms: 
as two groups of researchers have found, similarly 
situated borrowers experience diverse outcomes 
due to differences among servicers in the types of 
resolutions offered (Reid, Urban, and Collins 2014; 
Tian, Quercia, Ratcliffe, and Riley 2014).  
Percent of Loan Modifications 
This diversity in borrower outcomes has led to 
allegations that nonbank servicers perform fewer loan 
modifications than their peers. On this front, the truth 
is anything but clear, and modifications often vary by 
firm, rather than by firm type (bank versus nonbank 
servicer). Moreover, variations in loan modifications 
may reflect the more demanding nature of distressed 
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loans acquired and serviced by specialty firms. Fitch 
Ratings found that loan modifications by bank 
servicers decreased to 26 percent in the last half of 
2012, from 57 percent in the first half of 2010; in 
contrast, for nonbank servicers, loan modifications 
ranged between 69 to 71 percent during the same 
period (Fitch Ratings 2014). In its latest quarterly 
servicing index, Fitch found that loan modifications in 
Q4 2013 accounted for 63 percent of loss mitigation 
actions taken by nonbank servicers of nonagency 
mortgage-backed securities, versus 35 percent for 
banks, which also relied on a much higher share of 
short sales than nonbanks (Fitch Ratings 2014). The 
slight decline in modifications by nonbanks may 
reflect the quality of loans being handled at this stage, 
which have likely already been modified and failed, 
and thus do not qualify for further modifications, and 
the slight increase in modifications by banks may 
reflect that they have transferred most of their worst-
quality book of business to nonbanks, and are now 
dealing with higher-quality distressed loans that 
qualify for modifications.  
While HAMP represents only a portion of each 
servicer’s overall mortgage servicing operation, there 
are significant HAMP data available. Assuming that 
such data are illustrative, the data on HAMP loan 
modification request approvals indicate that between 
the program’s 2009 inception and April 2014, Ocwen 
and Nationstar approved fewer loan modifications 
than the biggest banks (Treasury 2014). While Bank 
of America, CitiMortgage, JPMorgan Chase, and 
Wells Fargo had approval rates of 43 percent, 
44 percent, 29 percent, and 30 percent, respectively, 
Ocwen, Nationstar, and Green Tree Servicing (which 
is owned by Walter) had approval rates of 22 percent, 
15 percent, and 40 percent, respectively. While Green 
Tree has equivalent modification rates, Ocwen and 
Nationstar have much lower lifetime HAMP approval 
rates. However, if we look at activity for one recent 
month, April 2014, the nonbank servicers look more 
like their peers: Ocwen and Bank of America 
approved 9 percent of HAMP modifications, and 
Nationstar had a 20 percent approval rate, while 
Wells Fargo had a 16 percent approval rate. Walter’s 
Green Tree actually approved 36 percent of 
modifications, a much higher percentage than most of 
the largest banks that month. The low nonbank 
HAMP lifetime approval rates may reflect that the 
banks are moving their most highly delinquent loans 
to nonbanks, while holding onto better-performing 
loans. It may also reflect the reality that nonbank 
servicers have more subprime loans and less prime 
loans. Subprime loans are less apt to pass the test that 
requires a modification to be net present value (NPV) 
positive.3 Additionally, if we base servicing quality on 
HAMP approval rates, then Green Tree Servicing 
comes out looking very good, with a HAMP lifetime 
3 Lenders calculate the NPV of mortgages to evaluate 
whether it is more cost-effective to provide a borrower 
with a loan modification or to foreclose. It estimates the 
likelihood that a borrower will go into default again and 
eventually end up in foreclosure anyway. If the results of 
the test show a modification will be NPV positive, then 
the investor will get a greater return from a loan 
modification; if the results are NPV negative, then a 
foreclosure is more economical for the investor.  
Table 2: Number of Loan Modification/Foreclosure Complaints as Percent of Number of Delinquent (DQ) Loans 




Bank of America 0.2% 0.4% 0.5% 0.4% 0.9% 0.9% 0.7% 0.4% 3.8% 
Wells Fargo 0.3% 0.4% 0.3% 0.3% 0.6% 0.6% 0.4% 0.2% 3.1% 
Ocwen 0.3% 0.4% 0.4% 0.3% 0.2% 0.2% 0.1% 0.1% 2.0% 
JPMorgan Chase 0.2% 0.4% 0.3% 0.3% 0.6% 0.6% 0.5% 0.3% 3.2% 
Citigroup 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.3% 0.5% 0.4% 0.4% 0.3% 2.6% 
Nationstar Mortgage 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.2% 0.2% 0.1% 1.3% 
Walter Financial 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.8% 
USB 0.4% 0.6% 0.4% 0.5% 1.1% 1.2% 0.9% 1.8% 6.2% 
PNC 0.4% 0.5% 0.4% 0.6% 0.8% 1.0% 0.7% 0.5% 5.0% 
SunTrust Banks 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.8% 0.8% 0.6% 0.5% 4.7% 
PHH 0.1% 0.3% 0.4% 0.3% 0.5% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 2.1% 
Industry 0.3% 0.4% 0.5% 0.4% 0.8% 0.9% 0.6% 0.4% 4.3% 
Source: Barker et al. 2014. 
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approval rate of 40 percent and a 36 percent approval 
rate in April 2014 alone. However, Green Tree 
Servicing was recently cited by the Office of Mortgage 
Settlement Oversight for failing more metrics at any 
one time than all of the other banks and servicers that 
are subject to compliance tests under the 2012 
national mortgage settlement (OMSO 2014).  
Resolution Speed 
Fitch also found that nonbanks have shorter 
timelines for resolving delinquencies: as of 2012, 
nonbanks averaged 14 months to resolve loans 
through a repayment, modification, short sale, or 
foreclosure, whereas banks averaged 22 months. The 
shorter time frame, however, does not necessarily 
suggest that borrowers fare better in the hands of 
nonbanks, since a fast foreclosure when a 
modification would have been possible is not 
necessarily a positive outcome for a borrower. 
Additionally, some research suggests that longer 
timelines make no differences in the ultimate default 
rate (Gerardi, Lambie-Hanson, and Willen 2011). 
Outcomes 
Finally, research has produced varying conclusions 
about borrower outcomes at the hands of nonbank 
versus bank servicers. In an analysis of 4 million 
individual loans from over 100 US servicers, Reid et 
al. (2014) found that loan cure rates (the percentage 
of delinquent loans returning to a current payment 
status each month) were not universally better or 
worse across nonbank servicers and banks. On the 
other hand, an analysis of loans to low- and 
moderate-income borrowers through Self-Help 
Credit Union’s Community Advantage Program 
found that, controlling for revealed risk profile, 
loans transferred to specialty servicers had lower 
rates of foreclosure than loans that were not 
transferred to specialty servicers (Tian et al. 2014). 
2. Servicing Transfers
Servicing transfers are quite complex in and of 
themselves, and the transition from one servicer to 
another not uncommonly results in service 
interruptions to borrowers in distress. Regulators are 
eager to ensure that borrowers in large MSR transfers 
are adequately protected, given that many affected 
borrowers may be in the middle of loss-mitigation 
procedures at the time of transfer. In January 2014 
this led the CFPB to implement new rules to ensure 
that most servicers have appropriate policies and 
procedures in place to protect consumers during MSR 
transfers. Given the newness of these rules, it is 
unclear whether they will result in improved 
consumer outcomes.  
To date, most of the large MSR transfers to specialty 
servicers have been comprised of legacy, high-
touch, distressed loans, and although transferring 
MSRs to nonbanks may sever the traditional bank–
borrower relationship, it’s worth considering 
whether such transfers may optimize outcomes for 
all parties. As noted above, the existing evidence is 
mixed: some research indicates that loans 
transferred to specialty servicers avoided 
foreclosure at a higher rate than loans not 
transferred to specialty servicers (Tian et al. 2014), 
and other, related research indicates that 
differences in individual servicer loss-mitigation 
practices influence loan outcomes as much as 
servicer type (Reid et al. 2014). In other words, who 
the servicer is matters more than whether the 
servicer is a bank or nonbank.  
Moreover, variability in servicer quality appears to 
be complicated by lack of transparency around 
whose interests are being served by specific loss-
mitigation practices. In some cases, modifications 
may be in the best interest of the borrower and 
servicer, but not investors who may believe a 
modification that substantially cuts the borrower’s 
principal balance and interest rate provides them 
less return than a quick foreclosure. (All 
modifications are required to be NPV positive, but 
many investors do not believe these tests are 
correctly applied.) In other cases, modifications 
may be in the best interest of the investor, 
borrower, and servicer, when the modification 
successfully avoids an expensive foreclosure and 
results in a steady stream of payments. As Reid et 
al. note, borrowers and investors may be assisted by 
regulations that ensure “all similarly situated 
borrowers receive consistent treatment, regardless 
of who their servicer is,” and additional 
transparency about how servicers make their loss-
mitigation decisions would also improve outcomes. 
3. Financial Risks and Regulations
That nonbank specialty servicers are lightly regulated 
has been viewed as an impetus for highly regulated 
banks to transfer their servicing rights to them. It also 
has compelled federal and state regulators to consider 
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imposing prudential banking standards, such as 
capital requirements and liquidity and risk 
management oversight, on nonbank specialty 
servicers (FSOC 2014; Ivey 2014). As the FHFA OIG 
(2014) stated, “these new servicers have less stringent 
regulatory and financial requirements than banks.” 
While it is true that nonbanks face many of the same 
risks as banks—that is, interest rate and prepayment 
risks—nonbanks’ financial stability is more sensitive 
to market changes, because their income relies so 
much on one highly volatile asset (MSRs). This raises 
the question of whether nonbanks require the same 
standard of regulation as banks—or perhaps a higher 
or different standard.  
Undiversified, Volatile Asset 
As noted, while nonbank servicers may require 
more regulation, it is unclear that they should be 
treated in the same way as banks. The value of 
servicing rights can fluctuate sharply depending on 
changes in interest rates; generally, as interest rates 
decline and loans are prepaid to take advantage of 
refinancing, the total value of existing servicing 
rights declines because no further servicing fees are 
collected on repaid loans. It’s important to 
understand that nondistressed servicing is more 
sensitive to prepayment and interest rate changes 
than distressed servicing, because distressed loans 
cannot refinance easily; however, specialty servicers 
are disproportionately affected by interest rate and 
prepayment rate volatility because their portfolios 
are undiversified, consisting solely of MSRs. The 
extreme volatility in MSR asset values makes it 
difficult to understand how existing assets are 
affected by market shifts, and how much capital is 
needed for their financial stability and to protect 
borrowers, lenders, and investors. To some extent, 
servicers have developed structures to reduce 
earnings volatility and shed prepayment risk, by 
transferring it to investors. In February, for 
example, Ocwen launched a synthetic security 
designed to transfer interest rate risk from itself to 
the capital markets. But such structures have yet to 
be deployed on a large scale (Goodman and Lee 2014). 
Liquidity Concerns 
In addition to the question of the appropriate level 
of capital for nonbank servicers, liquidity issues can 
lead to operational problems for specialty services, 
especially those that service loans in private label 
securitizations (PLSs). After they purchase MSRs, 
specialty servicers remit payments to the owner of 
the loan, either through a trustee in a PLS or to the 
mortgage originator if it still holds the loan. If 
borrowers whose loans are in a PLS miss their 
payments, servicers are still responsible for 
advancing payments to the PLS trust. To do this, 
nonbank entities borrow from deposit-taking 
institutions, because they lack a deposit base from 
which to draw funds. They pay high interest rates 
on these advances—and while servicers will be 
repaid for the advances when the loan is foreclosed, 
modified, or otherwise paid off, they are not 
compensated for the higher interest rates charged 
and may be responsible for advances for an 
extended period of time.  
The resource-intensive process of servicing 
distressed loans, coupled with the lack of liquidity 
and obligation to potentially make substantial 
advances to investors over extended periods of 
time, has allegedly led servicers to pursue outcomes 
calculated to reduce costs and stay financially 
viable, at the expense of investors and borrowers. In 
March 2013, for example, Nationstar was sued by a 
group of investors who alleged that the servicer 
auctioned off loans in bulk for a fraction of their 
value, “allowing them to more quickly recoup 
certain advances they made on the mortgage loans 
as part of their servicing duties” (KIRP LLC vs. 
Nationstar Mortgage LLC 2013). In other words, 
they believe Nationstar’s actions were driven by a 
need to reduce costs and increase profitability by 
converting illiquid MSR assets into cash, even 
though the sale did not produce the highest return 
to the investors. (The investors also questioned 
whether the nonperforming loan sales were 
permitted by the pooling and servicing agreements 
governing these transactions.)  
4. Business Affiliations
Specialty servicers argue that they are able to cost-
efficiently work with borrowers to modify or 
otherwise service their loans due to economies of 
scale derived over years of working with growing 
numbers of distressed borrowers. Such efficiencies, 
they argue, are achieved through business affiliations 
with other entities, such as providers of loan 
originations, securitizers, or foreclosure management 
firms. The level of vertical integration of the largest 
nonbank servicers stands in marked contrast to the 
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big banks, which have been more reluctant to embark 
on the same degree of business alignment. Recently, 
regulators have argued that these affiliate 
relationships incentivize servicers to act in ways that 
are not in the investors’ or borrowers’ interest, and 
instead, maximize profits for the allied companies. 
Nationstar, for example, has been acquiring 
companies (see figure 1) as its portfolio has 
expanded, with the goal of delivering wraparound 
services that support Nationstar’s financing arm. 
Not listed in figure 1 but mentioned in the 
aforementioned Nationstar lawsuit is auction.com, 
a “business partner” to which the investors allege 
that Nationstar “route[d] business to [benefit 
Nationstar]” (KIRP LLC vs. Nationstar Mortgage 
LLC 2013). 
Ocwen also has spun off several companies (see 
figure 2), which has led regulators to investigate 
whether the business connections have led to self-
dealing at the expense of consumers and investors. 
In a February 26, 2014, letter, NY DFS 
Superintendent Lawsky asked for clarification about 
the nature of Ocwen’s relationship with Altisource 
Portfolio Solutions, Altisource Residential 
Corporation, Altisource Asset Management 
Corporation, and Home Loan Servicing Solutions—
all of which are chaired by Ocwen’s CEO, who also is 
the largest shareholder in each company (Lawsky 
2014a). The NY DFS points out, “Ocwen’s 
management owns stock or stock options in the 
affiliated companies … rais[ing] the possibility that 
management has the opportunity and incentive to 
make decisions … that are intended to benefit the 
share price of affiliated companies, resulting in harm 
to borrowers, mortgage investors, or Ocwen 
shareholders.”  
In April 2014, Lawsky sent another letter specifically 
questioning Ocwen’s relationship with Altisource 
Portfolio, which has an eight-year agreement to 
manage distressed and repossessed homes in 
Ocwen’s servicing portfolio (Lawsky 2014b). 
Altisource Portfolio requires that properties be listed 
and marketed through Hubzu, even if a distressed 
borrower already signed a contract for a short sale. 
Ocwen’s executive chairman owns or controls 
26 percent of Altisource Portfolio’s stock. In the 
letter, Lawsky notes, “Hubzu appears to be charging 
auction fees on Ocwen-serviced properties that are 
up to three times the fees charged to non-Ocwen 
customers … when Ocwen selects affiliate Hubzu to 
host foreclosure or short sale auctions … the Hubzu 
auction fee is 4.5%; when Hubzu is competing for 
auction business on the open market, its fee is as low 
as 1.5%.” Lawsky goes on to say, “The relationship 
between Ocwen, Altisource Portfolio, and Hubzu 
raises significant concerns regarding self-dealing,” 
which may negatively impact homeowners and 
mortgage investors. This contrasts with claims by 
specialty servicers that their subsidiary companies 
and business alignments are designed to create 
efficiencies for customers and investors. According 
to a recent American Banker article, while 
“[m]arketing and selling homes online is … supposed 
to reduce the cost of buying a home[, i]n practice, 
affiliated businesses have done the opposite, and 
homes purchased through sites like Hubzu or 
auction.com can include total commissions of 
9 percent to 11 percent” (Berry 2014).  
Regulators are still trying to understand the nature 
of these business relationships, and should consider 
whether better disclosure of fees and increased 
transparency with respect to business alignments 
may lead to better outcomes for consumers and 
investors. Vertical alignments may lead to real cost 
savings and economies of scale, but because they 
also lead to self-dealing, to the detriment of 
investors and consumers, there is a strong case to 
be made for more transparency and disclosure.  
Figure 1: Nationstar Business Affiliations 
Source: Nationstar Mortgage 2014. 
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Figure 2: Ocwen Business Affiliations 
Source: Barker and Stewart 2014.
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Conclusion 
It does not appear that nonbank specialty servicers 
perform worse as a group than bank servicers; in 
fact, they may actually provide better service to 
delinquent borrowers given the difficult loans they 
tend to service. It is unclear exactly what steps 
regulators will take to provide more oversight and 
regulatory supervision in the nonbank specialty 
servicer space. The only certainty seems to be that 
more regulation is coming, because nonbank 
specialty servicers have become such an important 
part of the mortgage market, servicing a large and 
growing proportion of outstanding mortgage debt. 
In its July report, the FHFA OIG recommended that 
the FHFA enhance oversight of nonbank specialty 
servicers through a more consistent, standardized 
approach, including a risk management process and 
comprehensive framework to examine and mitigate 
risks. Regulators should consider the development 
of regulations that improve the safety and 
soundness of this channel, rather than those that 
eventually close it down. Ultimately, the question 
regulators need to face is how to best encourage all 
servicers to perform optimally for consumers, 
investors, and lenders, as well as for shareholders.  
Resources 
Barker, Kevin, Isaac Boltansky, and Steven 
Seperson. 2014. “Mortgage Finance: Are the Special 
Servicers Bad Actors?” Compass Point Research & 
Trading Report, Mar. 10. 
Barker, Kevin, and Jason Stewart. 2014. “Ocwen & 
Affiliated Companies Map.” Compass Point 
Research & Trading Report, Feb. 26. 
Bay, Carrie. 2014. “Cost of Compliance: 
Consolidation.” DS News, Jan. 16. 
http://dsnews.com/featured/01-16-2014/print-
feature-cost-of-compliance-consolidation. 
(Accessed July 2, 2014.) 
Berry, Kate. 2014. “N.Y.’s Lawsky Targets ‘Self-
Dealing’ by Ocwen, Realty Affiliates.” American 
Banker, Apr. 21. http://www.americanbanker.com/ 
issues/179_76/nys-lawsky-targets-self-dealing-
by-ocwen-realty-affiliates-1067015-1.html. 
(Accessed July 2, 2014.) 
Berthelsen, Christian, and Andrew R. Johnson. 
2012. “Ocwen’s Rapid Growth Puts Spotlight on Its 
Practices.” Wall Street Journal, Dec. 7. 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014241
27887324640104578163461378035442. 
(Accessed July 6, 2014.) 
California Reinvestment Corporation (CRC). 2014. 
Chasm Between Words and Deeds X: How 
Ongoing Mortgage Servicing Problems Hurt 
California Homeowners and Hardest-Hit 






(Accessed June 25, 2014.) 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB). 
2013. “Mortgage Servicing Transfers.” CFPB Bulletin 
2013–01, Feb. 11. http://files.consumerfinance.gov/ 
f/201302_cfpb_bulletin-on-servicing-transfers.pdf. 
(Accessed July 2, 2014.) 
Department of the Treasury (Treasury). 2014. 
“HAMP Application Activity by Servicer—As of 




4.pdf. (Accessed June 24, 2014.)
Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA). 2014. 
“Mortgage Servicing Transfers.” Advisory Bulletin 




Bulletin.pdf. (Accessed July 2, 2014.) 
Federal Housing Finance Agency Office of the 
Inspector General (FHFA OIG). 2012. “Evaluation of 
FHFA’s Oversight of Fannie Mae’s Transfer of 
Mortgage Servicing Rights from Bank of America to 
High Touch Servicers.” Evaluation Report EVL-2012-
008, Sept. 18. http://www.fhfaoig.gov/Content/ 
Files/EVL-2012-008.pdf. (Accessed July 2, 2014.) 
———. 2014. “FHFA Actions to Manage Enterprise 
Risks from Nonbank Servicers Specializing in 
Troubled Mortgages.” Audit Report AUD-2014-014, 
HOUSING FINANCE POLICY CENTER COMMENTARY AUGUST 4, 2014 
www.urban.org 12 
July 1. http://fhfaoig.gov/Content/Files/AUD-
2014-014.pdf. (Accessed July 2, 2014.) 
Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC). 2014. 
2014 Annual Report. Washington, D.C.: FSOC. 
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/Documents/
FSOC%202014%20Annual%20Report.pdf. (Accessed 
June 27, 2014.) 
Fitch Ratings. 2014. “A New Normal Emerging 
Among US RMBS Servicers.” Fitch Ratings Report 
– RMBS Servicing Index – USA, Mar. 26.
Gerardi, Kristopher, Lauren Lambie-Hanson, and 
Paul S. Willen. 2011. “Do Borrower Rights Improve 
Borrower Outcomes? Evidence from the 
Foreclosure Process.” Public Policy Discussion 
Paper No. 11-9. Boston: Federal Reserve Bank of 
Boston. http://www.bostonfed.org/economic/ 
ppdp/2011/ppdp1109.pdf. (Accessed July 2, 2014.) 
Goodman, Laurie, and Pamela Lee. 2014. “OASIS: 
A Securitization Born of MSR Transfers.” Housing 
Finance Policy Center at the Urban Institute 
Commentary, Mar. 31. http://www.urban.org/ 
UploadedPDF/413086-Oasis-A-Securitization-
Born-From-MSR-Transfers.pdf. (Accessed July 2, 
2014.) 
Government Accountability Office (GAO). 2014. 
“Troubled Asset Relief Program: More Efforts 
Needed on Fair Lending Controls and Access for 
Non-English Speakers in Housing Programs.”  
GAO-14-117. Washington D.C.: GAO. 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/660712.pdf. 
(Accessed July 2, 2014.) 
Ivey, Brandon. 2014. “States May Act on Capital 
Requirements for Nonbank Servicers.” Inside 





(Accessed June 27, 2014.) 
Kilgore, Austin. 2014. “Regs, Thinning of Servicers 
Squeeze Profits in Distressed Loans.” American 
Banker, June 19. http://www.americanbanker.com/ 
issues/179_119/new-rules-thinning-of-servicers-
squeeze-profits-in-distressed-loans-1068213-1.html. 
(Accessed July 2, 2014.) 
KIRP LLC vs. Nationstar Mortgage LLC. 2013. 
Supreme Court of the State of New York, New York 
County, Mar. 7. https://mirsnow.com/wp-content/ 
uploads/2013/03/KIRPComp.pdf. (Accessed June 
24, 2014.) 
Lawsky, Benjamin. 2014a. Letter to Timothy Hayes, 
General Counsel of Ocwen Financial Corporation. 
Feb. 26. 
http://www.housingwire.com/ext/resources/files/
Editorial/pr140226-letter.pdf. (Accessed June 24, 
2014.) 
———. 2014b. Letter to Timothy Hayes, General 
Counsel of Ocwen Financial Corporation. April 21. 
http://www.housingwire.com/ext/resources/files/
Editorial/Lawsky-Letter-to-Ocwen-RE-Altisource-
Hubzu.pdf. (Accessed June 24, 2014.)  
Nationstar Mortgage. 2014. “Q4 and FY 2013 
Earnings Presentation.” Feb. 27. 
http://investors.nationstarholdings.com/Cache/15
00056851.PDF?Y=&O=PDF&D=&FID=150005685
1&T=&IID=4288863. (Accessed June 24, 2014.) 
Office of Mortgage Settlement Oversight (OMSO). 
2014. “Compliance in Progress: A Report from the 
Monitor of the National Mortgage Settlement.” 
Raleigh, NC: OMSO. 
http://www.jasmithmonitoring.com/omso/wp-
content/uploads/sites/4/2014/05/compliance-
report-interactive-.pdf. (Accessed July 2, 2014.) 
Reid, Carolina, Carly Urban, and J. Michael 
Collins. 2014. “Servicer Heterogeneity: Does 
Servicing Matter for Loan Cure Rates?” 
Presentation to Housing Finance Policy Center 
Academic Research Council, the Urban Institute, 
Washington, D.C., May 28. 
Standard & Poor’s Financial Services (S&P). 2014. 
“Servicer Evaluation: Ocwen Loan Servicing LLC,” 
May 6. http://www.standardandpoors.com/ 
ratings/articles/en/us/?articleType=HTML&assetID
=1245367851331. (Accessed June 25, 2014.) 
Tian, Chao Yue, Roberto G. Quercia, Janneke 
Ratcliffe, and Sarah Riley. 2014. “Specialty 
Servicers and Mortgage Terminations.” 
Presentation to Housing Finance Policy Center 
Academic Research Council, the Urban Institute, 
Washington, D.C., May 28.  
HOUSING FINANCE POLICY CENTER COMMENTARY AUGUST 4, 2014 
www.urban.org 13 
Waters, Maxine. 2014. Letter to the Honorable 
Thomas J. Curry, Comptroller of the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency, and Joseph A. Smith, 
Jr., Monitor of the National Mortgage Settlement at 





July 2, 2014.) 
Copyright © August 2014. The Urban Institute. All rights reserved. Permission is granted for reproduction of this file, with attribution to the 
Urban Institute. 
The Urban Institute is a nonprofit, nonpartisan policy research and educational organization that examines the social, economic, and 
governance problems facing the nation. The views expressed are those of the authors and should not be attributed to the Urban Institute, its 
trustees, or its funders.  
The Urban Institute’s Housing Finance Policy Center (HFPC) was launched with generous support at the leadership level from the Citi 
Foundation and John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. Additional support was provided by The Ford Foundation and The Open 
Society Foundation. 
Ongoing support for HFPC is also provided by the Housing Finance Council, a group of firms and individuals supporting high-quality 
independent research that informs evidence-based policy development. Funds raised through the Council provide flexible resources, 
allowing HFPC to anticipate and respond to emerging policy issues with timely analysis. This funding supports HFPC’s research, outreach 
and engagement, and general operating activities. Funders do not determine research findings or influence scholars’ conclusions. Scholars 
are independent and empowered to share their evidence-based views and recommendations shaped by research. The Urban Institute does 
not take positions on issues. 
